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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Claudia Moreno Garcia (Claudia) and Silvia Moreno 
Garcia (Silvia) petition for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an 
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Immigration Judge (IJ) rejecting their applications for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Although we find 
sufficient merit in Silvia‘s petition to order a remand, we will 
deny Claudia‘s petition. 
I
1
 
 Claudia was born on October 31, 1977, in Guatemala 
City, Guatemala.  In late December 1998 or early January 
1999, Claudia illegally entered the United States at San 
Ysidro, California.  Claudia‘s younger sister Silvia was born 
on April 6, 1981, also in Guatemala City.  Silvia illegally 
entered the United States at San Ysidro in October 2005. 
 A little over a year after Silvia entered the United 
States, the Department of Homeland Security served Claudia 
and Silvia with separate Notices to Appear, charging 
removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Both sisters conceded 
removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT protection, claiming that if they are returned to 
                                                 
1
 To the extent the Immigration Judge‘s factual 
findings are not so clearly erroneous that ―any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,‖ 
we accept them as ―conclusive.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
See infra Part II.A.  We also supplement the IJ‘s version of 
the facts and correct minor misstatements therein by 
including details found in Claudia‘s and Silvia‘s affidavits 
and testimony, but we do so only to the extent they do not 
conflict with the IJ‘s findings. 
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Guatemala, they will be persecuted by Valle del Sol, a violent 
gang the Guatemalan government allegedly cannot control. 
 Although the sisters‘ affidavits and testimony before 
the IJ indicate that their respective problems with Valle del 
Sol were distinct, both traced their problems with the gang 
back to their cousin, Hilda Marleny Sosa del Cid (Hilda).  In 
1986, shortly after Claudia and Silvia‘s father died, their 
mother moved to the United States, leaving her daughters 
with her sister Gloria.  Hilda, who is one of Gloria‘s five 
children, is roughly the same age as Claudia.  The sisters‘ 
living situation with their aunt Gloria and cousin Hilda was 
not ideal.  Gloria withheld the money that Claudia and 
Silvia‘s mother sent them from the United States, and Hilda 
was violent and associated with gang members, one of whom, 
Jorge Solis Mexicanos, became her husband.  Mexicanos was 
a career criminal and a leader of Valle del Sol. 
II 
A 
 We first consider Silvia‘s petition for review because it 
presents a closer question than Claudia‘s petition.  In the 
summer of 2003, Hilda used Silvia‘s home telephone to help 
Valle del Sol assassinate a prominent human rights activist 
named Jose Lopez-Lopez.  After the murder was 
accomplished, Hilda told Silvia that gang members Juan 
Carlos Munoz Castillo (aka ―Topacio‖) and Dennis 
Marroquin participated in the crime and warned Silvia that 
she would be killed if she helped the authorities find Lopez-
Lopez‘s killers.  Silvia‘s safety concerns were exacerbated by 
the fact that she was pregnant at the time and also looking 
after her younger sister, Danay. 
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 On August 14, 2003, the investigation of Lopez-
Lopez‘s murder led police to Silvia, who refused to cooperate 
even after several hours of interrogation.  At the end of their 
questioning, the police left, telling Silvia they would return 
the following day.  Silvia then received a telephone call from 
an unknown woman who told her that Hilda was concerned 
that Silvia would report her to the police.  The woman then 
requested a meeting with Silvia in a park.  Silvia declined the 
invitation and went to stay with a friend instead. 
 The following day, Silvia met police officers at a 
church.  She and the officers then traveled to a restaurant 
where they discussed the evidence against her (i.e., the fact 
that a phone call that led to Lopez-Lopez‘s murder came from 
her house).  The police threatened to arrest Silvia, but she 
refused to disclose any information.  After leaving the 
restaurant, however, Silvia learned that her house had been 
ransacked.  Too frightened to return home, Silvia fled to her 
grandfather‘s house but was turned away because her 
relatives feared retaliation from Hilda.  Silvia then turned to a 
lawyer who recommended she leave Guatemala City and not 
tell anyone where she was going, but added that she should 
call him in a few days.  Silvia followed the lawyer‘s advice 
and went to stay with a friend several hours away in the city 
of Escuintla. 
 When Silvia called the lawyer, he told her there was 
nothing he could do and it was unlikely any lawyer would 
take her case.  He explained that Silvia had two options: side 
with the authorities or with Valle del Sol.  That day, Silvia 
contacted officials from Guatemala‘s Public Ministry and 
arranged a meeting at a restaurant.  Officers transported her 
from the restaurant to another building where, for the first 
time, Silvia agreed to give a statement implicating Hilda, 
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Topacio, and Marroquin.  In return for her assistance with the 
prosecution, the Public Ministry officials agreed to place 
Silvia and her sister Danay in witness protection until Silvia 
testified and then relocate them to another country. 
 While in witness protection, Silvia and Danay were 
protected around the clock by armed security teams.  In 
addition, they were moved from hotel to hotel as many as 
twelve times in three months because of potential security 
breaches.  At various times prior to trial, security personnel 
were forced to transport Silvia and Danay in armored cars, 
strictly control their food, keep them away from windows, 
and arrange for a special trip to the hospital to address a 
problem with Silvia‘s pregnancy.2  
 Silvia claimed that despite these security precautions, 
Hilda threatened her over the phone.  Silvia also learned that 
Marroquin had evaded trial and disappeared, and that Hilda‘s 
brother, Henry Sosa, was threatening Claudia and her mother 
in the United States. 
 Silvia appeared in court twice in October 2003.  The 
first time, she did not testify because the defendants, Hilda 
and Topacio, were not given proper notice.  Two weeks later, 
Silvia testified under oath outside the presence of the 
defendants while wearing a disguise and a bulletproof vest.  
Notwithstanding these precautions, Silvia received a phone 
call from an unknown individual who said that Silvia was 
being watched during her first court appearance and that if 
she testified, she and Danay would be killed.  The caller also 
                                                 
2
 By the time arrangements were made for Silvia to get 
to the hospital, it was too late, and she suffered a miscarriage. 
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mentioned that Henry Sosa knew where her mother and 
Claudia were living in the United States. 
 A little over a month after Silvia testified, she and 
Danay were relocated to Mexico, where the Guatemalan and 
Mexican governments, along with the United Nations and 
other international organizations, arranged for them to 
register as refugees.  In Mexico City, Silvia and Danay met 
with representatives from Mexico‘s refugee commission, the 
Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR), as 
well as two non-governmental organizations and the United 
Nations.  They were taken to a hotel, and Guatemalan 
officials remained in Mexico City to assist in their transition. 
 Approximately two months later, in February 2004, 
Silvia and Danay were granted refugee status in Mexico, 
which permitted them to remain in the country as long as they 
renewed their status annually.  According to Silvia, however, 
the threats persisted.  In the spring of 2004, Silvia saw Dennis 
Marroquin on the subway.  After Silvia reported the 
encounter to COMAR, she and Danay were relocated to 
Guadalajara, Mexico, where they were placed in refugee 
housing.  Meanwhile, Hilda, who was in prison at the time, 
kept calling. 
 In September 2005, Danay and Silvia‘s relationship 
fractured, and Danay left Mexico for the United States.  Silvia 
claimed that for the rest of her time in Mexico, she was 
discriminated against and treated poorly because of her 
refugee status, which made it difficult to find a job.  
Consequently, she decided to move to Tijuana, Mexico, so 
she could enter the United States.  Once in the United States, 
Silvia moved to New Jersey where she lived with her mother 
and Claudia. 
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 Silvia testified before the IJ that Henry Sosa called her 
in the United States and told her to recant her testimony.  
Silvia refused to do so, and Hilda was convicted.   Silvia also 
testified that she later saw Sosa on the street in New Jersey 
and that he began calling her house, telling her Hilda would 
soon get out of prison and implying that some harm would 
befall Silvia once Hilda was released.  Silvia also testified 
that Hilda has been released from prison and unsuccessfully 
attempted to enter the United States. 
B 
The IJ issued an oral decision denying Silvia‘s 
application, finding that she was barred from receiving 
asylum because she had firmly resettled in Mexico before 
entering the United States.  Oral Decision of the IJ, Garcia & 
Garcia, File Nos. A094783360 & A094783359, at 18–19 
(June 2, 2008) (IJ Dec.).  The IJ also determined that although 
there was ―a plethora of documentation about Silvia‘s 
testimony, [and] Silvia‘s assistance in the prosecution against 
Hilda,‖ she was not eligible for asylum or withholding of 
removal because any persecution she might face is not on 
account of her membership in a cognizable ―particular social 
group‖ (i.e., individuals who testify against gang members).  
Id.  The IJ noted that there was no corroborating evidence 
regarding Sosa or the threat he might present in the future, 
and that even if Sosa might look to harm Silvia, the 
Guatemalan government had shown it was willing and able to 
protect her.  Id. at 19–21.  Finally, the IJ rejected her CAT 
claim citing a lack of evidence that the Guatemalan 
government would acquiesce in, or turn a blind eye to, her 
torture.  Id. at 21. 
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Silvia appealed, and the BIA issued an opinion 
affirming the IJ‘s decision.  The BIA relied primarily on two 
of the IJ‘s findings: (1) ―that Silvia did not demonstrate an 
objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in 
Guatemala because she did not show that she is unable or 
unwilling to avail herself of the protection of the Guatemalan 
government;‖ and  (2) ―that the Guatemalan government is 
willing to protect Silvia such that she cannot be considered a 
‗refugee‘ within the meaning of the [INA].‖  Decision of the 
BIA, File Nos. A094783360 & A094783359, at 2 (Dec. 31, 
2009) (BIA Dec.) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(C)).  
The BIA added in a footnote that it ―also concur[s] with the 
[IJ]‘s alternative ruling that the harm [Silvia] fears is not on 
account of a protected ground.‖3  Id. at 4 n.1.  Both sisters‘ 
CAT claims were rejected for the reason stated by the IJ.  Id. 
at 2–3. 
Silvia filed a petition for review, arguing that the BIA 
adopted the IJ‘s opinion without providing its own analysis, 
                                                 
3
 The IJ did not actually discuss the ―on account of‖ 
element of an asylum claim.  We assume that the BIA was 
referring to the IJ‘s finding that Silvia was not a member of a 
―particular social group,‖ IJ Dec. at 19, 22, and that is the 
finding we will review.  The Government agrees with this 
understanding of the BIA opinion.  See Appellee‘s Br. at 30 
n.9 (noting that the agency has not yet considered ―whether . . 
. there is a nexus between the harm [Silvia] suffered or fears 
and a protected ground‖). 
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and that the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard, ignored 
precedent, and disregarded evidence.
4
 
C 
 ―We exercise de novo review over constitutional 
claims or questions of law and the application of law to 
facts.‖  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The IJ‘s factual findings ―are conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Under this 
―extraordinarily deferential standard,‖ Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2003), findings of fact 
―will be upheld if [they are] ‗supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered 
as a whole.‘‖  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 
(1992)). 
 When the BIA adopts or defers to the underlying 
decision of the IJ, we review the IJ‘s opinion as the decision 
of the agency.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2001).  As the Government argues, however, ―review 
                                                 
4
 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, which grant it appellate 
jurisdiction over ―[d]ecisions of Immigration Judges in 
removal proceedings.‖  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  See also Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 
215, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2004).  Venue is proper in this Court 
because removal proceedings were completed in Newark, 
New Jersey.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
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of the immigration judge‘s decision would be proper in this 
case . . . only to the extent affirmed or incorporated by the 
Board.‖  Appellee‘s Br. at 21 n.3 (citing Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 
587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009)).  In this case, the BIA 
agreed with several of the IJ‘s findings but did not adopt all 
of them.  Accordingly, we may affirm the BIA‘s decision 
only if we find that its stated reasons are correct, as it was the 
BIA—not the IJ—that provided the final and authoritative 
―grounds invoked by the agency.‖  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 163 
(3d Cir. 2005) (reviewing only BIA‘s finding that ―assuming 
[petitioner] was credible, he failed to establish past 
persecution,‖ not IJ‘s adverse credibility determination, 
because BIA did not adopt credibility finding); cf. Dia v. 
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
under Chenery, when the BIA affirms the IJ without opinion, 
we review the IJ‘s opinion as ―the grounds invoked by the 
agency‖). 
D 
1 
 With the aforementioned standards in mind, we turn to 
Silvia‘s petition for review.  We begin by noting that Silvia 
did not argue in her opening brief that the BIA erred in 
denying her CAT claim, so that issue is waived.  See Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Nagle 
v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) (―When an issue is 
either not set forth in the statement of issues presented or not 
pursued in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.‖)).  Thus we 
review only Silvia‘s requests for asylum and withholding of 
removal. 
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 Whereas an application for withholding of removal 
requires a showing that there is a ―clear probability‖ of 
persecution in the country to which an applicant will be 
removed, Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)), an application for asylum 
must establish only that the applicant is ―unable or unwilling 
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of  [past] 
persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion,‖ 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  
―[A]n applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if . . . 
[t]here is a reasonable possibility‖ that she will suffer it, 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i), and a showing of past persecution 
creates a rebuttable presumption of such a well-founded fear, 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  The persecution ―must be 
committed by the government or forces the government is 
either unable or unwilling to control.‖  Sukwanputra v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
2 
 The Government argues that Silvia did not establish 
her ―[inability] or unwilling[ness] to avail herself of the 
protection of the Guatemalan government.‖  Our review of 
the record compels us to disagree. 
 The parties agree that Silvia‘s conflict with Hilda and 
Valle del Sol began when she initially decided to assist the 
Guatemalan government and seek its protection—a decision 
that left her and her sister Danay under armed guard, moving 
from hotel to hotel each time there was a feared security 
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breach.  Ultimately, the Guatemalan authorities took the 
drastic measure of working with the Mexican government, the 
United Nations, and several international organizations to 
obtain refugee status for Silvia and Danay in Mexico.  These 
extraordinary measures demonstrate that the Guatemalan 
government believed there was a ―reasonable possibility‖ 
Silvia would be persecuted if she remained in Guatemala.  
For that reason, we find no support for the BIA‘s finding that 
Silvia does not have a reasonable fear of persecution if she is 
returned there. 
 Although the Guatemalan government displayed great 
willingness to protect Silvia before and after her testimony in 
the Lopez-Lopez murder trial, this willingness sheds no light 
on Guatemala‘s ability to protect her.  The fact that 
Guatemala saw fit to relocate Silvia to Mexico is tantamount 
to an admission that it could not protect her in Guatemala.  
Guatemala‘s decision to move Silvia may have prevented 
future harm, but it does not constitute ―protection‖ in the 
same way that a government‘s law enforcement apparatus 
protects its people by maintaining a state of law and order.  
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Guatemala will 
be any better able to protect Silvia if she is returned there 
now.  We see no reason to doubt, then, that Silvia fears 
retaliation from the same individuals and organization that the 
Guatemalan government could not control eight years ago.  
Accordingly, the BIA‘s finding that she has failed to meet this 
element is not supported by substantial evidence. 
 The BIA‘s alternative holding—that any persecution 
Silvia might face in Guatemala would not be based on her 
membership in a ―particular social group‖—also is not 
supported by substantial evidence.  In Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233, 1239–40 (3d Cir. 1993), we adopted the interpretation 
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of ―particular social group‖ that the BIA announced in Matter 
of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).  Under Acosta, 
a ―particular social group‖ is defined as: 
[A] group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic. The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as 
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some 
circumstances it might be a shared past 
experience such as former military leadership or 
land ownership. [T]he common characteristic 
that defines the group, it must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences. 
19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.  The parties agree that Silvia testified 
against Hilda and other members of Valle del Sol.  She 
therefore shares a ―common, immutable characteristic‖ with 
other civilian witnesses who have the ―shared past 
experience‖ of assisting law enforcement against violent 
gangs that threaten communities in Central America.  It is a 
characteristic that members cannot change because it is based 
on past conduct that cannot be undone.  To the extent that 
members of this group can recant their testimony, they 
―should not be required to‖ do so.5 
                                                 
5
 The BIA has rejected a similar social group 
comprised of ―noncriminal informants,‖ finding that it lacked 
the ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ required under the 
BIA‘s new interpretation of the phrase ―particular social 
group.‖  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959–61 (B.I.A. 
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 The BIA has not yet addressed several other elements 
of Silvia‘s application for asylum and withholding of 
removal—including whether the harm she might face in 
Guatemala rises to the level of persecution, whether there 
would be a nexus between any persecution and her 
membership in a particular social group, and whether she was 
―firmly resettled‖ in Mexico such that she is barred from 
receiving asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2)(i)(B).  We 
leave these matters to the BIA on remand.  See I.N.S. v. 
Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). 
III 
 Unlike Silvia, Claudia‘s interactions with Valle del Sol 
were quite limited, she never testified against Hilda or any of 
Hilda‘s associates, and she never requested protection from 
the Guatemalan government.  Claudia‘s claim is based on her 
                                                                                                             
2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 
F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. 
Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007).  In re C-A- 
is distinguishable, however, in that it involved confidential 
informants whose aid to law enforcement was not public, 
whereas in this case, Silvia‘s identity is, and always has been, 
known to her alleged persecutors.  Moreover, in Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United States, we held 
that the BIA has failed to sufficiently explain and justify its 
addition of ―particularity‖ and ―social visibility‖ to the 
traditional Acosta requirements.  --- F.3d ----, No. 08-4564, 
2011 WL 5345436, at *22 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).  Until the 
BIA provides an analysis that adequately supports its 
departure from Acosta, we remain bound by the well-
established definition of ―particular social group‖ found in 
Fatin. 
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belief that she will be persecuted either because she is Silvia‘s 
sister or because she became friendly with Hilda in 1998 and 
learned about Valle del Sol activities, but then rejected what 
she perceived to be attempts at recruitment into the gang.  
Like Silvia, Claudia claimed that Hilda and Henry Sosa found 
her and her mother living in New Jersey and threatened them 
in person and by telephone.  Claudia also alleged that Hilda 
has since been released from prison and tried to enter the 
United States, but she was turned away at the border. 
The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that Claudia‘s 
asylum application was time-barred and that, in any event, 
she was unable to show a clear probability of future 
persecution because she never sought police protection, the 
Guatemalan authorities went to great lengths to protect her 
sister Silvia, and she failed to provide evidence to corroborate 
her affidavit and testimony about threats.  IJ Dec. at 14–18; 
BIA Dec. at 2–3.  The BIA also affirmed the IJ‘s holding that 
Claudia was not entitled to relief under CAT because she 
could not show that the Guatemalan government would 
acquiesce in, or turn a blind eye to, her torture.  IJ Dec. at 18; 
BIA Dec. at 3.  Claudia does not dispute the BIA‘s findings 
that her asylum application was untimely and that she failed 
to establish a claim under the CAT.  Thus we review only 
Claudia‘s request for withholding of removal. 
 To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, 
an alien must show either (1) that she has suffered past 
persecution in the country of removal ―on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion,‖ in which case, a rebuttable presumption 
of future persecution applies; or (2) that she will be 
persecuted in the country of removal—i.e., there is a ―‗clear 
probability‘ that the alien‘s life or freedom would be 
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threatened upon her removal to a particular country,‖ Chen, 
434 F.3d at 216 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 412 
(1984)) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A))—for one of the 
same reasons (race, religion, etc.).  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)–
(2); Myat Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Under the ―clear probability‖ standard, the 
applicant must show that persecution would ―more likely than 
not‖ occur.  § 208(b)(1)(iii), (2); Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y 
Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 2011).  ―[A]s with any claim 
of persecution, the acts must be committed by the government 
or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to 
control.‖  Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 637 (citation omitted). 
 Nothing in the record compels us to reach factual 
findings contrary to those reached by the IJ in respect to 
Claudia‘s case.  Claudia admitted during her testimony that 
she never personally contacted law enforcement in Guatemala 
about her interactions with Hilda and Valle del Sol, and 
although she may have been understandably fearful while she 
was living in Guatemala, there is nothing in the record to 
support a finding that she was ever persecuted in the past.  
Claudia must therefore show a clear probability of future 
persecution, which she cannot do in light of the IJ‘s finding 
that Claudia and Silvia failed to corroborate their testimony 
about threats Claudia allegedly received after she entered the 
United States.  There is no reason for us to upset the IJ‘s 
determination that such corroboration could reasonably be 
expected and that Claudia and Silvia did not adequately 
explain its absence.  See Abdulai, 239 F.3d 554 (announcing 
three-part inquiry for whether an application may be denied 
based on a failure to corroborate).  On this record, we agree 
with the BIA that Claudia failed to meet her burden of 
 18 
 
showing it is more likely than not that she will face 
persecution in Guatemala.  We will therefore deny Claudia‘s 
petition for review. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will deny Claudia‘s petition 
for review, grant Silvia‘s petition for review, and remand 
Silvia‘s case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
